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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A brief experiment was done to test the hypothesis that very heavy- 
target loads -would adversely affect a human tactical decision-maker while 
the same number of targets would not degrade the performance of auto­
matic system. The study was done in the context of a series of air defense 
exercises using the Cornfield System. Three levels of automaticity were 
introduced: the system was programmed to run without any human intervention
(Mode I), the fully automatic system had a CIC Officer who could override 
computer decisions or make his own decisions if he chose to do so (Mode II), 
and a CIC Officer had to make all decisions regarding threat evaluation and 
selection and assignment of weapons while the computers did only routine 
vectoring of interceptors (Mode III). All automatic decisions were made 
by the Illiac computer.
An experienced naval officer served as CIC Officer. In addition to 
varying systematically the degree of automaticity, two scripts differing 
in the numbers of targets they contained were used. A moderate load script 
had 57 high speed raids and the heavy script contained 60 raids, all 
programmed to penetrate the defended area. Weapons used against these raids 
were six oOO-knot interceptors. The kill criterion was a five-mile closing 
range between an interceptor and the target to which it had been assigned.
A total of 2b half-hour runs were made, four under each unique Mode-script 
combination. Illiac was used to observe and record various events as they 
occurred and the computer also refereed interceptions.
Results of the experiment did not support the hypothesis which 
predicted adverse effects of heavy target load when a man had primary
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decision responsibility in the system. Actually, in this study, the more 
automatic versions of the system allowed more target penetrations and 
accomplished fewer kills than did the least automatic mode. Percentages 
of bombings were 18.5 o/o and 9*8 o/oj proportions of targets killed during 
heavy load runs averaged 69*2 0/0 and 85.8 0/0 for Mode« I and 111, 
respectively. Other conclusions of the experiment may be summarized as 
follows:
1. When a human decision-maker was present (Modes II and i n )  relative­
ly more targets which penetrated the system were under assignment at the 
time of penetration, than when all decisions were done automatically. This 
effect seemed to underscore the greater flexibility of the man who, in a 
close race, might tend to keep up the chase even though the probability of a 
successful kill was low.
2. The mixed mode which permitted both the CIC Officer and the compute* 
to assign weapons produced a kind of competition between the man and. the 
machines. Particularly under the heavy load condition, the lam tended te 
make more of the final assignments before kill3 occurred. That is, while 
more assigning and de-assigning of weapons was done by the computer, most
of those assignments immediately preceding kills were made by the CXC 
Officer. Noteworthy, too, was the fact that this effect became more 
pronounced as the experiment progressed: as he gained experience and
familiarity with the system the CIC Officer took over even more of the 
decision function from the computers.
5* Under the moderate load condition average kill range was higher 
for the two automatic systems (Modes I and II) than in the manual system.
When the heavy script was run this difference disappeared.
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4. Estimates of the effort expended by interceptor aircraft —  number 
of miles flown while under assignment —  showed a difference between modes 
favorable to the least automatic system: in Mode III runs (heavy load) 
each of the six fighter aircraft averaged 155*7 combat miles per run 
while the figures for Modes I and II were 200.0 and 207*0 miles, 
respectively.
5* The ratio of target assignments to kills were lowest for the 
human system. That is, fewer assignments were made in order to accomplish 
each kill when the CIC Officer alone did the assigning than in the more 
automatic modes. , 4
6. There was some evidence that the ClC Officer took advantage of 
portions of the scripts which had patterned target courses. He tended 
to manage his weapons so that sequences of assignments to the same 
interceptor could be set up. The automatic control program as presently 
constructed could not do this.
7. Although Cornfield has provisions enabling a human user to 
• /
display selected targets (by class, category, or status), the CIC 
Officer failed to make use of this facility. He indicated that he 
believed partial filtering of target information would result in a 
loss of understanding of the overall situation« Implications of the 
study for designers of automatic decision-making machines are discussed 
in a separate chapter.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1958 an experimental study of the Cornfield System, operated under
*various modes of human intervention, was reported. Here it was shown that 
the system was able to perform an air defense mission in a fully automatic, 
or ’’hands-off” mode as effectively as when humans were permitted to inter­
vene to varying degrees.
These results of the Artful experiment raised several questions* The 
most perplexing of these pertained to the similarity between runs in which 
key decision elements of the system differed so widely. On one hand the 
system was programmed to operate fully automatically while on the other 
it required a man to make all decisions. One possible explanation for the 
similarity between human and automatic versions of the system had to do 
with the nature of the scripts or battle problems confronting Cornfield.
In the Artful experiment two load levels were generated: each contained
single plane, high speed (^50 - 6>0 knots) raids which reached peak 
simultaneous loads of 5 or 10 for the so-called light and heavy loads. 
Observers of the Artful experiment felt that even the heaviest of these 
loads, while perhaps stressful for the humans in the system, did nob 
begin to approach the specified limits of the computers. We wondered 
whether the uniformity in performance was not due simply to having used 
such light loads that any configuration of the system would be able to 
deal effectively with them.
* See Sinaiko, H. Wallace. Artful: An experimental study of an automatic
air defense system under varying conditions of human intervention.
CSL Report R-104. June 1958. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Subsequent to the Artful experiment a long series of fully automatic 
runs was completed' in which many stimulus (script) ana system parameters 
were varied. In the process of completing this series new scripts were 
developed and one of these, consisting of the heaviest raid load yet faced 
by the system, led to the present pilot study.
The principal hypothesis in the present experiment was that the 
observed similarity between automatic and manually-aided versions of the 
Cornfield System would disappear under conditions of overload and that the 
automatic system configuration would emsrge superior to more manual set-ups. 
From the point of view of nman-in-the-system", we predicted that very heavy 
informational inputs would degrade the man’s performance while the automatic, 
fully computerized system would be unaffected by similar loads. In this 
study, then, we measured the air defense performance of Cornfield under two 
heavy load conditions and with three variations in the role of the human 
in the system.
A NOTE OF CAUTION
It should be emphasized that the work reported here was conceive^ and 
conducted as a pilot study. As such there are many limitations which imply 
cautious interpretation. For example, a single subject was used throughout 
so that we have no estimate of variance due to individual differences 
between people who might be used to operate similar systems. No attempt 
was made to disguise the fact that only two scripts were used repeatedly. 
While certain standard precautions were taken to minimize biases due to
* To be reported in CSL Report R-115*
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experimental error, this cannot be called a "sanitary” experiment.
Because the results were both unexpected and interesting we are publishing 
the study with this precautionary note.
METHOD
Purpose. The purpose of this experiment was to determine the effects 
of very heavy target load on the air defense performance of the Cornfield 
System operating at different levels of automaticity. Measures of per­
formance are listed in a later section.
System description. The Cornfield System has been described in 
*detail elsewhere . The system has the capability of conducting a real 
time, simulated air defense mission including automatic detection,
**tracking, and display; also, incorporating the ICON II control program , 
Cornfield can do automatic threat evaluation, weapon selection, weapon 
assignment, and interceptor control. As presently constructed Cornfield
• * V,
is limited to a track capacity of 512 single targets. The control program 
can handle up to 15 weapons (interceptor aircraft).
Figure 1 shows the CIC Officer station. This is identical to that 
used in the Artful experiment with two minor additions. First, a special 
display was built to provide both an auditory signal and an interceptor 
identification light whenever an end-of-intercept (kill) occurred. The
See Appendix A, CSL Report R-10^ for a brief description. Also, see 
CSL Reports R-35 and R-63. . . .
See Appendix B, CSL Report R-104, for a short summary of the ICON II 
program. A more complete description of ICON II will appear in CSL 
Report R-106.
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display is shown to the right of the CIC Officer. Also, a four-position 
switch (shown beside the CIC Officer’s left hand) was provided to make it 
possible to display selectively the following target categories: assigned
interceptors, unassigned interceptors, assigned raids, and unassigned raids.
Allocation of automatic and human functions. The system was operated 
in three modes or degrees of human intervention. The first, Mode I, was a 
fully untouched-by-human-hands operation. (These runs were actually 
completed after the officer-subject had departed.) In Mode II the system 
was programmed to perform all functions automatically but the CIC Officer 
could intervene as follows: he could make manual assignments of weapons
to targets; he could undo automatic assignments; he could put interceptors 
in a restricted status which prevented them from being considered by the 
computer; he could restrict raids so that they could not be evaluated or 
assigned weapons by the computer. Of course, any of these interventions 
could also be undone or returned to automatic status. (Unlike the Artful 
experiment, a restriction on the use of interceptors in this study was that 
they could occupy only two states: either they were assigned and being
flown toward a raid or they were unassigned and being orbited around a 
station or they were being flown toward the station. This limited flexi­
bility was an artifact of the way interceptors were generated in the present 
study. Generation of fighter aircraft will be described in a later section.)
In Mode III the control program had the threat evaluator and weapon 
assigner routines turned off and, therefore, these functions had to be done 
by the CIC Officer. Once a weapon and raid were paired, the computer took
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over and automatically vectored the interceptor. As in Artful, all inter­
ventions by the CIC Officer vere done via a keyset operator. (See 
Figure 2.)
The air defense mission. As in the Artful experiment the system had 
as its mission the defense of a vital zone, 10 miles in diameter, 
surrounding a hypothetical protected point. By definition, any raid 
penetrating the vital area was considered to have bombed the protectee.
To conduct its mission the system was provided with six sections of 
airborne interceptors which were orbiting on station at the start of each 
run. The six interceptor stations were equally spaced on the circumference 
of a 30-mile radius circle around the protected point.
Simulation of fighter aircraft. An additional departure from the
methodology of the Artful experiment was the use of synthetically generated
*interceptors instead of "piloted” 15-J-lc target generators. In the 
present experiment Illiac was used to generate fighter aircraft which were 
tracked by the special purpose tracking computer (TASC). Changes in 
heading originated in Illiac and were transmitted to TASC which dead- 
reckoned or turned the interceptors accordingly. Turn rates were held 
constant at 2°/sec. All fighter speeds were constant at 600 knots whether 
under assignment or in orbit status.
* See CSL Progress Report for September, October, November 1958 for an 
experimental comparison of the performance of the two types of 
interceptors.
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Simulation of raids. Hostile aircraft were generated from pre­
programmed scripts which had "been punched into paper tapes. A conventional 
5-hole tape reader was used to transmit script information from the tapes 
to TASC. One additional attribute of this method of simulation is that 
hostile targets which have been judged killed are Immediately faded from 
the displays.
Scripts. Two scripts or radar problems were used. The first, 
designated ’’moderate’', was 50 minutes in duration, contained a total of 
57 raids, and had an average simultaneous load of 15 targets. Targets 
ranged in speed from to 700 knots. Of the total, 17 raids were 
’’critical”, i.e. programmed to fly courses carrying them inside the 10- 
mile vital zone. The remaining 20 targets were diversionary.
The second script, to be referred to as "heavy”, was approximately 
50 minutes long and had a total of 6o targets, all critical. These targets 
were scheduled to appear in three waves of 20 each and none of the waves
*overlapped the other two in time. The maximum simultaneous load was 20. 
Unlike the moderate load script, which had critical targets fade approxi­
mately overhead (if they had successfully penetrated the vital zone), the 
heavy script targets were programmed to fly through the vital zone and on 
to prearranged landing fields, beyond the radar horizon. It was possible, 
then, under heavy load conditions, for a target to penetrate the protected
Because there were always six interceptor aircraft present the maximum 
number of targets which could appear on the display was 26 in the heavy 
load, 19 in the moderate load.
<
\
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area and be killed on its outward or returning heading. In the heavy 
script 50 0/0 of all raids flew at 600 knots, 25 0/0 at UOO knots, and 
25 0/0 at 800 knots.
Although it is not possible to provide precise quantitative 
descriptions of the three 20-raid waves used in the heavy script, some 
comments on the target patterns in each wave can be made. Wave 1 consisted 
of omni-directional tracks with little or no recognizable patterns. Raids 
in this wave originated at launch points in the MW, ME, and SE. Most 
targets in this wave made at least one turn before reaching the vital 
zone. After penetration, raids in Wave 1 headed out of the vital zone along 
a SW corridor.
Wave 2 contained several realistic-appearing patterns of raids. Four 
aircraft, for example, flew in a tight finger-tip formation which was 
easily recognized. Raids in Wave 2 turned and flew back toward their 
points of origin after penetration.
Wave 5 hau 20 radial targets which appeared almost simultaneously, 
widely distributed in bearing from the vital zone. The heavy load script 
was programmed to terminate when the penetrating targets of Wave 3 reached 
a place over the protected point.
Subjects. A single subject served as CIC Officer in all runs. This
man, a Navy lieutenant, was a member of the University of Illinois Naval
*R.O.T.C. staff and he had served in the earlier Artful experiment.
We want to express our appreciation to Captain R. C. Knowles, Commanding 
Officer, and CDR. J. M. Mason, Executive Officer, for their cooperation 
in making available the officer-subject.
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Because of his previous experience with the system the GIC Officer required 
only minimal practice —  about three half-day sessions —  to familiarize 
himself with the displays and procedures used in the study.
Two keyset operators, each serving in approximately one-half of the 
total number of runs, were recruited from the CSL Controls Group staff.
Experimental Design. There were four unique experimental conditions: 
two load levels and two intervention inodes. Each condition was repeated 
four times, to provide estimates of variance and average performance, making 
a total of sixteen runs. The order of running was randomized.
Measurement of Performance. The automatic data collection program
-x-used in the Artful experiment was also used in the present study with some 
additional features. The data observing and recording program —  DOPE —  
noted target penetration of the vital zone in terms of target identity, 
time, and whether or not the target was under assignment when it penetrated. 
All the other data on assignments and de-assignments, described in the 
Artful report, were also recorded.
RESULTS
Bombings. Table 1 summarizes overall performance of the three system 
configurations for both moderate and heavy loads. With the lighter load 
condition an average of 0.5 critical raids per run penetrated the system in 
Modes I and II and, in the least automatic version, no raid ever bombed the 
system in Mode III. In the heavier load runs the poorest performance was
* .See CSL Report R-104, pp. 17-19.
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Table 1
Overall Air Defense: Raid Penetration
/ *\ (Run means and standard deviations )
MODE
LOAD I II III
X 0.5 0.5 0.0
MODERATE
c 0.5 0.5 0.0
X 18.8 10.3 9.8
HEAVY
a 3.^ 3 A
i
L—  .1
k .9
observed for the fully automatic system: 18.8 raids (51*2 o/o of all 
targets) successfully penetrated the vital zone on the average. Modes 
II and III averaged nearly identical number of bombings suffered:
10.3 and 9.8 per run respectively (17-2 0/0 and 16.3 0/0). Note, how­
ever, that in the more stressful load condition the variability of the 
human decision-maker (Mode III) was higher than in either of the other 
conditions•
Standard deviations shown are based on computational methods described 
in Chapter 16, "Microstatistics", Dixon, W. J., and Massey, F. J., 
Introduction to Statistical Analysis, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 
New York, 195'lr•
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Bombings by assigned targets. Considering only those raids which 
penetrated the system we asked, at the time they reached the vital zone, 
how many targets were being actively pursued, i.e., under assignment to an 
interceptor? Table 2 shows the answer to this question for the heavy load 
condition. (The absolute number of penetrations under moderate script 
conditions was too low to provide meaningful data.) Here there appears to
Table 2
Proportion of Penetrating Targets Under Assignment 
(Heavy Load only)
Source of MODE
Assignment I II III
Man j+5*8 o/o 38.5 0/0
Computer 21.6 o/o 19.5 0/0 
_____________ ,
—
be a clear difference between the three modes. The automatic system was 
the lowest in terms of this measure: in Mode I runs only about one out of
five targets which bombed the system were under assignment at the time they 
crossed into the vital area. This is consistent with the structure of the 
ICON II program. Only under certain limited circumstances will the program 
fail to call-off an assignment if it is apparent that the raid will reach 
the 10-mile protected area before being intercepted. In Mode III, in which 
all assignments and de-assignments had to be done manually, the proportion
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of assigned targets which bombed the system rose to 58*5 o/o of all pene­
trating raids. Here, unlike Mode I runs, the CIC Officer was apparently 
either more willing to continue to pursue marginal targets, i.e*, raids 
which he thought might be killed before they penetrated, or he may have 
been so overloaded that he couldn’t recognize futile assignments in time 
to call off his fighters. Still another possible explanation for this 
difference between the fully automatic and manual systems may lie in anf
inherent human characteristic: under circumstances with extreme outcomes
likely to occur (eg. loss of a fleet or a ship), the human decision-maker 
may be much more likely to play long odds because of the high pay-off if 
he is successful. In the vernacular of some Navy air controllers, we have 
observed that men are much more prone to ’’give it a try" than are computers 
in the same situation.
Also shown in Table 2 is the even higher proportion of assigned 
targets which bombed the system during Mode II runs: 65.5 0/0. Most of
these assignments originated from the CIC Officer rather than the computer: 
of the 26 assigned targets which bombed the system, 18(69.5 0/0) had manual 
assignments and 8(50.5 0/0) were automatically assigned. Considering only 
penetrating targets which were assigned by the CIC Officer, the proportions 
were similar for Modes II and III: 0/0 and 58*5 0/0. Also, automatic
assignments in Modes I and II were alike: 21.6 0/0 and 19*5 0/0. It is
likely, then, that the high proportion shown for Mode II in Table 2 reflects 
a simple summation of what manual and automatic systems would do operating
alone
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Kills. Another criterion of air defense capability is the proportion 
of targets killed in each run. Table 5 shows this for the six experimental
Table 3
i Proportion of Targets Killed
MODE
LOAD I II III
MODERATE 87.8 0/0 90.0 0/0 87.8 0/0
HEAVY 69.2 0/0 86.3 0/0 85.8 0/0
!
conditions. These figures represent total target kills, which in the 
moderate load runs include non-critical as well as critical targets. During 
heavy load runs, in which all targets were critical, a few raids were killed 
after they had bombed the vital area and these are included in 'Table 3* As 
in earlier reported data there was close similarity between all modes under 
moderate load and between Modes II and III in the heavy load runs. It is 
apparent that as load built up the completely automatic system —  Mode I —  
was less well able to defend itself in terms of this measure. The relatively 
good performance of Modes II and III in heavy loads was largely due to the 
CIC Officer's participation as shown in the following section.
Type of assignment preceding kills. Table k is a breakdown of kills 
following manual or computer assignments in Mode II mans. This data indi­
cates that, while more kills occurred after manual than automatic assignment,
PE
R
C
E
N
TA
G
E
 O
F 
A
S
S
IG
N
M
E
N
TS
 
R
E
S
U
LT
IN
G
 
IN
 K
IL
LS
115-21
D A Y
FIGURE 3. EFFECTS OF PRACTICE ON HUMAN INTERVENTION: 
PERCENTAGE OF KILLS FOLLOWING MANUAL AND COMPUTER 
ASSIGNM ENTS.
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Table 4
Proportion of Target Kills Following Manual or Automatic Assignment:
Mode II only.
LOAD MANUAL COMPUTER
MODERATE 59.2 0/0 4o .8 0/0
HEAVY 64.8 0/0 35.2 0/0
this effect was most pronounced in the heavy load runs. By definition all 
assignments in Mode I were automatic and all in Mode III were done by the 
CIC Officer. The figures shown in Table 4 suggest that the contribution 
of the man in Mode II tended to be relatively greater as stress on the 
system increased. (This is in agreement with data reported in the Artful 
experiment which, under very light loads, showed 55 o/o manual and 65 0/0 
computer assignments preceding kills.)
In addition to determining average proportions of target assignments 
leading to kills, we have looked at changes over time with respect to this 
behavior. Figure 5 shows, for the two load conditions, what happened as 
the experiment progressed and the CIC Officer gained experience. It is 
apparent here that not only did the man make more assignments resulting in 
kills as loads increased but his tendency to do this went up markedly as 
he became more experienced with the system. For example, in Table 4, for 
•vt h e heavy load, about two-thirds (64.8 0/0) of all kills followed manual 
assignments. When the data are separated into runs, as shown in the bottom
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half of Figure 3, manual assignments preceding kills increased steadily to 
84 o/o by the fourth run under this experimental condition.
Number and type of weapon assignments. Table 5 shows the average 
number of assignments which were made under each of the six experimental 
conditions. For each load condition the rani: order for the three interven 
tion modes remained the same: most assignments made in Mode II, next most
i ( 1in Mode I, fewest in Mode III. Also, with the approximate doubling of the
Table 5
Weapon Assignments 
(Run means and standard deviations)
,
LOAD I... turn*
MODE
II III
X 59-0. 73.3 41.8
MODERATE
0 7.3 15.5 3.9
X 123.0 169.5 80.0
HEAVY
a 19.9 k i . 8 8.3
number of targets from the moderate to the heavy load scripts, the number 
of assignments made in each mode also increased by about a factor of 2. 
The difference between Modes II and III is also of interest: about twice
as many assignments were made in Mode II runs, for each load level, as in
the more manual Mode III
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Table 5a is a breakdown of the origin of weapon assignments, i.e., 
manual or computer, for Mode II runs only. Under both load conditions 
about two-thirds of all assignments were made automatically. (This 
supports data reported in the Artful experiment.) Referring back to
Table 5a
Distribution of Weapon Assignments by Source, Mode II Runs Only
LOAD
SOURCE OF ASSIGNMENT 
MANUAL COMPUTER TOTAL
X 27.3 46.0 7 3 0
MODERATE
o/o 57.1 o/o 62.8 o/o 100.0 0/0
X 58.5 111.0 169.5
HEAVY
o/o
J_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
34.2 o/o 65.7 0/0 100.0 0/0
Table ii-, which shows the proportions of target kills following the two 
types of assignments, it is worth noting the reversal of the proportions 
in Table 5a. 'That is, while about two-thirds of all assignments (in 
Mode II) were made by the computer, only one-third of all kills followed 
assignments from this source. This probably reflects the very high 
frequency of computer assignments and de-assignments of interceptors 
without being consummated by kills; much less often did the human decision­
maker tend to shift his pairings of weapons and targets.
Range of target kills. The average kill range for each experimental 
condition is shown in Table 6. Mean ranges dropped as heavier loads were
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Table 6
Average Kill Range (miles)
(Run means and standard deviations)
LOAD
MODE
I II III
X
MODERATE
0
ii-5.0 ^5.0 59-5 
l . k  1.9 2.9
X
HEAVY
a
29.5 28.5 50.0 
5.4 1.9 0.9
encountered, reflecting a pulling-in of defenses as the number of raids 
increased. Within each load level, differences between modes were not 
consistent. That is, in the moderate script condition the more automatic 
modes —  I and II —  had the best performance; in the heavy target condition 
all three modes were about the same for this measure. Also, variability 
tended to reverse itself: the manual (Mode III) system had the highest
variability at moderate load and the least variability in the heavy load. 
There is no readily apparent explanation for this.
Distance flown by assigned interceptors. Another measure of system 
performance -- average number of miles flown by each interceptor while in 
assigned status —  is shown in Table 7 • These figures are means for each of
the six fighter aircraft used per run. Note that, in both load conditions,
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Table 7
Distance Flown by Assigned Interceptors (miles) 
(Hun means and standard deviations)
LOAD I
MODE
II III
X 150.0 13^*0 95*5
MODERATE
a 25*5 28.2 11.2
X 200.0 207*0 155*7
HEAVY
1 a
__________________ i
17*6 8.7 17*5
the number of miles flown is lowest for Mode III runs. 'This is a 
reflection of the data reported above in the discussion of target assign­
ment. In those modes in which the computer could, or had to, make assign­
ments there was a great deal of shifting back and forth. This is apparent 
in both Tables 5 and 7 in which the number of assignments was high and the 
average distance flown under assignment was also high for Modes I and II. 
Recalling the data in Table 1, which showed overall air defense to be as 
good or better under the least automatic condition, the present figures are, 
perhaps, more impressive: that system which relied most heavily on human
decision-making conducted the best defense and used available weapons most 
efficiently.
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Ratio of target assignments to kills. A measure derived from two 
types of records reported above is shewn in Table 8. This is the ratio of 
assignments to kills and it answers the question, how many assignments were 
made for each target kill? The ratios in the accompanying table indicate
Table 8
Ratio of Target Assignments to Kills
MODE
LOAD I II III
MODERATE 1.8 2.2 1.3
HEAVY 5.0 3-3 1.5
that, at both load levels, the least automatic system (ifode III) made 
fewer assignments per target killed than either of the other two modes. 
This effect is in agreement with the Artful experiment data and also data 
derived from an experiment on a conventional manual (i.e., grease pencil, 
sound-powered telephone) CIC. As mentioned in the Artful report, the 
apparently greater efficiency of the Mode III runs may actually be an 
artifact of the observational technique used in these experiments. While 
every assignment made by computers, in Modes I and II, was recorded by the 
DOPE program, many of these were of extremely short duration, i.e., a few 
seconds, when the computer alternately shifted its selection of a weapon 
from one fighter to another. The only manual assignments (Mode III) which
See CSL Report R-10^, pp. 22 and
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■were recorded by DOPE were those ordered by the CIC Officer through the 
keyset. It is likely that the human decision-maker made some tentative 
assignments !'in his head" before selecting a final best weapon and 
relaying his assignment to the computer. Only the latter selection would 
have been recorded by the DOPE program. The differences between Modes 
I/II and Mode III should not be discounted entirely, however. As presently 
operated the automatic versions of Cornfield did send vector orders to the 
interceptors each time an assignment was made, no matter how short the 
duration of that assignment. That this resulted in some unnecessary 
expenditure of interceptor effort has already been shown in Table 7, 
"Distance Flown by Assigned Interceptors".
Analysis of system performance by script waves. The section on 
"Scripts” in the Method chapter has described the character of the heavy 
script in terms of the three waves of 20 targets each. Tables 9; 10 and 
11 show how the Cornfield System fared against these three waves of
Table 9
Raid Penetration by Script Wave 
(Run means)
SCRIPT
WAVE I
MODE
II III
1 6.5 2.7 3.8
2 2.5 1.8 0.7
3 9*8 5.8 5.3
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targets under each condition of intervention. We have done this breakdown 
of the data on the heavy script because it seemed likely that the 
behavior of the three modes might show effects due to the different 
characteristics of the script waves.
Table 10
Number of Targets Killed by Script Wave 
(Run means)
MODE
SCRIPT
WAVE I II III
1 15.8 18.5 17-5
2 17.8 18.5 19*5
5 10.2 14.7 14.7
Wave 2, which contained clusters of targets flying recognizable 
patterns, was most easily handled by all three versions of the system: 
there were fewer bombings and more targets killed in Wave 2 than in either 
of the other waves. Also, the system requiring the CIC Officer to do all 
threat assessment (Mode III) seemed to fare relatively better against 
Wave 2 than either of the more automatic modes.
Wave 5> containing only straight-in radial targets, was least easily 
dealt with by all three modes. In each mode approximately 50 o/o of all 
raid penetrations occurred during the third wave of targets. Wave 5 targets
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also tended to draw fewer assignments that the earlier two waves; this was 
most pronounced for the fully automatic mode and least so in Mode III. 
Considering the distribution of target assignments (Table 11), the
Table 11
Humber of Assignments by Script Wave 
(Run means)
SCRIPT
WAVE
SOURCE OF 
ASSIGNMENT I
MODE
II III
Man — 22.0 26.2
1
Computer 1*5.5 32.7 —
Man — l8.5 29.3
2
Computer 52.2 47.0 —
Man — 18.O 24.5
3
Computer 25.3 31.3 —
systems using the computer to make assignments (Modes I and II) were most 
influenced by the different waves. Put another way, Mode III, which 
required a human to make all assignments, had its assignments more evenly 
distributed over the three waves of targets than Modes I and II.
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SOME ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
Capacity of a human decision-maker. As we have already indicated the 
experiment did not provide any evidence that a human tactical decision­
maker would become saturated with as many as 26 air targets under simul­
taneous surveillance. It is important to recall, however, that in this 
study the CIC Officer worked with a "clean" display: the clear picture
produced by Cornfield shows continuous target information with no noise 
or fading to interfere with a viewer's perception of the display. Obviously 
there is some number of targets beyond which a man cannot continue to 1 
maintain a high level of performance. We believe that this upper limit is 
far less than the 512-target capacity of Cornfield's tracking computer.
Just what the man's limit is remains to be determined in future studies.
Human learning. One implication of the present study for designers 
of automatic decision systems is man's capacity to modify his behavior with 
experience —  that is, to learn. Our single CIC Officer subject demonstrated 
this in several ways. First, he developed a type of anticipatory behavior 
in assigning weapons. While the control program might assign three inter­
ceptors to three raids which were in the same vicinity, the CIC Officer 
rarely did this. He would use a single interceptor to engage the raids 
separately in sequence while holding the remaining two fighters on station 
for more appropriate assignments. (The latter behavior probably resulted In 
better protection of the vital zone by not pulling all interceptors off in 
one direction although we have no measure of this.)
*
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Compel; it ion becween man and machine» We have observed in other 
studies as well as this one that as stress on the system builds up human 
decision-makers tend to take over more and more of the total task from 
automatic system elements. Under light target loads and in mixed modes of 
operating Mode II —  CIC Officers have often merely monitored the 
computer as it did all weapon assigning. As the numbers of targets 
increases, however, the men tend to assume more decision responsibility. 
Further, the rate at which CIC Officers do this seems to increase with 
their experience.
Hiese views are supported by observations made during a recent fleet 
exercise in which the only operational semi-automatic information system, 
tne British CDS, was employed. On this occasion it appeared that the 
automatic features of the CDS were rarely used by the Air Defense Officer 
who preferred to work directly from a raw radar display, Oftis behavior 
appeared to have two causes: lack of confidence in the automatic system
and resistance to change from traditional manual ways of doing the job.
In our laboratory studies, when failure has no serious consequences 
(eg. loss of pilots or aircraft), the reasons why CIC Officers choose to 
reject the computers when under pressure are not as obvious. It may be 
that the above explanations about CDS users hold for our subjects, too. 
Further experiments should be done to verify this •
R. M. Brovn, CSL Report I-89, Comments on the CDS System and Operation 
Riptide, July 1959, SECRET. --------------= = =
*
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Use of display composition facilities. One of the supposed advan­
tages of automatic information storage systems (eg. Cornfield, CDS, and Naval 
Tactical Data System) is that men working in the systems may select targets 
to be displayed according to class or type or some other category. In the 
Cornfield System, for example, it is possible to do partial filtering of 
some information on all targets (eg. eliminate tracking quality digits from 
each raster) as well as make grosser selections of targets by class, 
identity, and engagement status.
In the present experiment we expected our CIC Officer to make use of 
the selective switching facilities of his display in order to simplify the 
picture. Actually, our subject never made useof this feature of the system. 
His stated reason for preferring to have all targets displayed continuously 
was that he feared he would lose his understanding of the overall situation 
if he momentarily filtered certain information. We think this behavior has 
implications for future training programs if such selectivity is to be 
useful in similar systems. Perhaps experimentation should be done to 
verify our subject’s explanation of his actions.
Pattern recognition. It was obvious that the CIC Officer was able to 
detect certain patterns of targets and deal with them as groups in making 
assignments. For example, where a single interceptor could be used to 
defend against two or more targets in sequence, the man set this up
For an extensive definition of the problems of display composition in 
computer-aided systems see : Coburn, R. Display composition in complex
computer-aided systems* Navy Electronics laboratory Report Ö45,
24 June I95Ö . Unclassified.
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accordingly. The computer, programmed to treat each object as separate 
and unrelated to any other, could not make use of patterns or groups of 
targets. While the desirability of automatic pattern recognition is not 
new or unicue to our situation, we have made this observation to under­
score the need for its inclusion in future automatic tactical data systems.
Absolute judgements: human vs. computer. We have shown that the
number of unassigned targets penetrating the system was greater in the 
fully automatic mode than in the more manual modes. One of our tentative 
explanations for this lies in man’s relatively poor ability to make 
absolute judgements and to do computations compared with a computer.
Illiac, programmed to perform precise computations —  based on closing 
velocities, relative headings of interceptor and target, and similar 
data —  could derive a simple "yes” or "no" answer to the question:
Do I have time to complete the interception before the raid reaches the
-*vital zone? The human decision-maker, confronted with a complex, 
changing display of information might answer the same question with an 
additional alternative: ' "maybe". It is in this area of uncertainty that 
we feel the man would decide to continue the interception effort even 
though its outcome was doubtful. Perhaps, too, man’s sensitivity to his 
own survival needs was operating here. That is, in the marginal area of 
choice the man’s decision to continue an interception would be affected by 
his knowledge of what might happen if the raid penetrated the vital zone.
Our computer has not had this type of sensitivity built into it.
The reason that computer decisions were not correct 100 o/o of the time is 
that certain approximations were used which, under some circumstances, 
led to erroneous conclusions.
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